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In the Supreme Court 
of· the State of Utah 
MARILYN BINGHAM, an infant, by JACK T. 
BINGHA~I, her guardian ad litem, and JACK T. 
BINGHAM, in his own right, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF OGDEN CITY, 
a public corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
STATEMENT 
Plaintiff, by his amended complaint, (Paragraphs 
2 and 3 of which were amended by written stipulation 
of counsel to correct a patent error which is not mater-
ial to this appeal), seeks to recover judgment against 
the Board of Education of Ogden City upon two causes 
of action growing out of the alleged maintenan~e of a 
nuisance upon the open and unprotected public school 
grounds where children played at the Central Junior 
High School, located at 781 - 25th Street, Ogden, Utah, 
wherein the plaintiff's little daughter, less than three 
years of age, was severely burned by reason of her 
falling into hot ashes, embers, cans, and other burning 
and hot substances which were allowed to be scattered 
around an op~n, unguarded incinerator placed upon 
said school grounds and used by the janitor· as a garb-
age disposal. 
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The first cause of action sought recovery for the 
benefit of the child as the result of her injuries. The 
second cause of action sought a recovery by plaintiff 
himself by way of reimbursement for moneys paid out 
by him and bills and obligations contracted for doctor 
and hospital bills incurred in the treatment of said child. 
Defendant has made no point as to the propriety 
of joining these two causes of action, so that we believe 
no further mention of the same is necessary. 
Defendant filed a general demurrer to each cause 
of action upon the ground that neither stated facts suf-
ficient to constitute a cause of action. The trial Court 
sustained said demurrer. Plaintiff elected to stand upon 
said amended complaint, whereupon the Court entered a 
judgment of dismissial as to each cause of action. Plain-
tiff appeals from the judgment of dismissal. 
Two points only are presented for consideration 
of this appeal : 
1. Is a Board of Education liable in damages for 
injuries sustained by a child of tender years who is 
injured by and through the maintenance of a nuisance 
upon its school grounds 7 
2 Does plaintiff's amended complaint allege suffi-
cient facts from which a jury might find that the condi-
tions of which plaintiff complains constituted a nuis-
ance~ 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS 
Appellant relies upon the following errors committed 
by the trial Court for a reversal of the judgment of dis-
missal: 
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1. THE COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING DEF-
ENDANT'S GENERAL DEl\IlTRRER TO PLAIN-
TIFF'S .~.\:\!ENDED CCl~IPLAINT AND IN ENTER-
ING ITS JUDG1\IEXT DIS~IISSING EACH OF SAID 
CAUSES OF ACTION. 
ARGUl\IENT 
POINT 1. A· BOARD OF EDUCATION IS LIA-
BLE FOR D.~.\:\l.A .. GES SUSTAINED BY AN INFANT 
CHILD WHILE PLAYING UPON ITS SCHOOL 
GROUNDS SET APART AS PLAYGROUNDS 
WHERE SUCH INJURIES WERE CAUSED BY OR 
THROUGH THE MAINTENANCE OFA NUISANCE. 
It is the contention of the defendant and the theory 
of the lower Court that a board of education, being an 
agent of sovereignty, is immune from such liability. 
The question of sovereign immunity has been a sub-
ject of much litigation and on no other subject, perhaps, 
is there more confusion among the decisions of the 
various courts. 
It has been well stated that: 
''The ru1e of governmental immunity is subject 
to a great number of exceptions, many of which . 
are purely arbitrary and without; any relation 
to grounds upon which the Courts please to 
base the genral rules. The whole doctrine of 
governmental 1mtmunity from liability for torts 
rests upon a rotten foundation. It is almost 
incredible that in this modern age of comparative 
sociological enlightenment, and in a republic, the 
medieval absolutism supposed to be implicit in 
the maxim 'The King can do no wrong' should 
exempt the various branches of government from 
g· 
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liability for their torts and that the entire bur-
den of damages resulting from the wrongful 
acts of the government should be imposed upon 
a single individual who suffers the injury rather 
than . dis~ributed among the entire community 
constituting the government, where it could be 
borne without hardship upon any individual and 
where it justly belongs.'' 
Comments of Annotator, 
75 A.L.R. 1196. 
It has been further said: 
''Law writers and editors generally have criti-
cized and dis a ppr.oved the doctrine of govern-
mental immunity as illogical and unjust." 
Comments of Annotators, 
160 A.L.R. 23 
22 Virginia Law Review 910 
54 Harvard Law Review 437 
See also annotations in 
- 120 A.L.R. 137 6. 
By reason of its harshness and the illogical basis 
upon which ·the doctrine rests, Courts quite generally 
have restricted rather than extended the doctrine, so 
that there are now many recognized exceptions or limit-
ations adopted by many courts. They may be sum-
marized in the language of the· annotator as follows: 
''Although the authorities are far from uniform 
in this matter, various exceptions or limitations 
have been recognized or adopted by some courts 
in connection with the rule of tort non liability 
as applied to certain agencies or authorities in 
4_ 
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charge of public schools or public institutions 
of higher learning, providing·, of course, that 
the particular ag·ency or authority is amenable 
to suit and that it is the proper party defend-
ant. These exceptions may be summarized as 
permitting recovery: 
1. For a tort arising out of or committed in 
the performance of a proprietary as distinguished 
from a governmental function or activity, 
2. For damage or injury to private real property 
or property rights in respect thereto or conse-
quential injuries thereon resulting from a tres-
pass or the creation or maintenance of a nuisance, 
3. For the taking or damaging of private prop .. 
erty for public use without compensation, 
4. For personal injury or death caused by the 
creation or maintenance of a nuisance, 
5. For injury or death caused by an active or 
positive wrong or a wilful or intentional act, 
6. Where recovery may be predicated upon 
breach of contract rather than tort, and 
7. The view bas been adopted by some Courts, 
notably those of New York, that a school dis-
trict or a school board may be liable for its own 
acts or ommissions as distinguished from those 
of its officers, agents or employees.'' · 
Comments of Annotator, 
160 A.L.R. 21. 
The annotator further comments: 
''Although there is authority to the contrary, 
several Courts have ruled that municipal cor-
porations in charge of public schools, as well 
as school districts and state univerities, which 
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are amenable to suit, are liable for the creation 
~r ma_intenance of a nuisances on school pre-
mises resulting in damage to or consequestial 
injuries on private real property, even though 
committed in the performance of governmental 
functions.'' 
Many cases and text writers are cited by the annot-
ator in support of the above statements. They are 
all found in the elaborate notes in the above annotations. 
Although there is authority to the contrary, the 
general rule of law is that counties, municipal govern-
ments, and other governmental agencies created solely 
by statute as subdivisions of the government are not 
liable for the negligence of its officers or employees 
unless expressly provided for by statute. 
However, in nearly every jurisdiction, the courts 
have held that such an agency, _even though acting in 
a governmental capacity, loses its immunity from lia~ 
bility for damages when its acts or conduct or the acts 
or conduct of its employees creates a nuisance and 
injuries or damage results from said nuisance. 
McQuillan on Municipal Corporation, 
Section 2641 
states the rule that a municipal corporation when act-
ing in a governmental capacity is liable for injuries 
caused by the maintenance of a nuisance. 
See also 
The Law of Nuisances by Joyce, 
Section 346, 
whieh also deals 'with this problem and sets forth 
the rule that a school district is liable in damages for 
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injuries sustained when ~aid injuries arise out of the 
maintenance of a nuisance by such an agency. 
See also 
Hoffman Y. City of Bristol, 
155 Atl. 499, 
wherein the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that 
although the operation of maintaining a swimming pool 
in a park open to the public in general was a govern-
mental function of the City, the City was liable for 
the injuries received by the plaintiff, when, through 
the conduct of the City by its employees, a diving board 
was maintained over shallow water which rendered 
the use of the diving board inherently dangerous. 
On Page 500 of 155 Atl. the Court used the follow-
ing language : 
''Where a municipal corporation creates and 
maintains a nuisance; it is liable for damages 
to any person suffering special injury therefrom, 
ir;respective of whether the .. misfeasance or non-
feasance causing the nuisances also constituted 
negligence. ·The liability cannot be avoided on 
the ground that the municipality· was exercising 
governmental functions or powers, even in juris-
dictions where, as here, immunity is afforded 
from liability for negligence in the performance 
of such functions.'' 
6 McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, 
815 et seq.; 43 Corpus Juris·, p. 956. 
''If the natural tendancy of the act complained 
of is to create danger and inflict injury upon 
the person or property he found a unisance as a 
matter of fact; but,· if the act in its inherent 
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nature is so hazardous as to make the danger 
e~t,~eme and serious injury so probable as to be 
almost a certainty, it should be held a nuisance 
as a matter of law." · 
Melker vs. New York, 190 N. Y. 
481, 83 N. E. 565, 16 L. R. A. 
(N. S.) 621, 13 Ann Cas. 544. 
While, as we have seen, Connecticut has so far 
aligned with those states which do not hold a 
municipality liable for negligence in the per-
formance of governmental functions and duties 
we have definitely and repeatedly recognized 
that a sirp.ilar immunity does not attach to nui-
sance created by it.'' . · 
In an early Indiana Case, 
Haag vs. Board of Commissioners 
of Vanderburg County, 
60 Indiana 515, 
the same question was presented to the Supreme Court 
of Indiana. In that instance the plaintiff had charged 
the County with maintaining a nuisance, to wit: a pest 
house, to her determent and resulting in injuries to 
her property and also had charged that the main-
tenance of such a nuisance caused the· death of three 
of her children through infectuous disease. The Sup-
reme Court of ·Indiana. on Page 515 · of the decision 
used the following language: 
''A municipal corporation has no more right 
to maintain a nuisance than an individual would 
have, and· for a nuisance maintained upon its 
prope~ty, the same liability !attaches against 
a city, as to an individual.'' 
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We regard the ·rule thus laid down as correct in 
principle and as equally applicable to a county. 
Upon a careful review· of the authorities, we are led 
to the conclusion, that the several paragraphs of the com-
plaint are sufficient upon demurrer, and that the court 
erred in holding them otherwise. 
In the case of 
Pearce et al vs. Gibson County 
et al, 64 SW 33, · 
the Supreme Court of Tennessee enjoined the defend-
ant, Gibson County, from creating a nuisance which 
would be detrimental to the plaintiffs. The Court in 
its ruling used the follo~ng language : 
In 
''But it is· well settled that a municipalty or 
county, in in the construction of a public work, 
is not privileged to commit a nuisance to the 
special injury of the citizens, and for such act 
is liable as a private individual in damages, or 
if may be restrained by the writ of injunction." 
56 Corpus Juris, page 530, 
Section 621, 
the general law is set forth as follows: 
''The district is ... however liable where its acts 
and ommissions result in the creation of a 
nuisance ... to persons suffering special damage 
therefrom.'' 
In a rather recent case; the· Idaho Supreme Court 
has held that an action would lie against a. school dis-
trict to enjoin a nuisance. 
9· 
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Hansen vs Inde.pendent School 
District,. 98 P .2d 959 
The subject is treated in 
39 Am. Jur. 837, Section 41. 
In view of the fact, however, that our own Court 
has on frequent occasions discussed this matter, we 
feel that further citations are unnecessary. 
Section 75-9-8, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1943, 
expressly authorizes suits to be brought against. the. 
Board of Education. This· Court has repeatedly adopted 
the more humanitarian trend of limiting rather than 
extending sovereign immunity. It has adopted the so-
called liability for negligence committed in a prop-
rietary as distinguished from governmental pursuit. It 
has also adopted the theory of liability for damaging 
property without compensation, as distinguished from 
the taking of property without compensation. 
In the case of 
Croft vs. Millard County Drainage 
District, 59· U tab 121, 
202 Pac. 539, 
Mr. Justice Thurman, speaking for the Court, uses the 
following language: 
''It is difficult to understand upon what prin-
ciple such a corporation (a drainage district) can 
claim the right to enter upon the land of another 
and perpetrate wrongs thereon resulting in a 
substantial injury and when confronted in a 
c.ourt of justice with a claim for damages under· 
take to defend itself upon some technical appli· 
10 
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cation of the antiquated idea that 'The King can 
do no wrong' or, if he does, the wrong is simply 
damnum absque injuria. In the darkest ages of 
medieYal history "'"hen despotic rule flourished 
among the semi-barbarous nations of the old 
world, it was even then considered barely toler-
able to assert in behalf of kingly rule the doctrine 
that 'The King ca11 do no wrong.' Upon what 
principle, then, in the twentieth century of the 
Christian era, in the most enlightened age of the 
world, in a free American commonwealth, should 
a voluntary corporation, created solely for pri-
vate benefit, be permitted to invoke the same 
doctrine in order to escape the consequences of 
wrongs either deliberately or carelessly perpe-
trated against the property rights of another? 
Even the state itself, when acting within the 
scope of its sovereign powers, cannot take or 
damage private property for public use without 
making just and adequate compensation to the 
person to whom the property belongs.'' 
We believe that the case of 
Husband vs. Salt Lake City, 
92, Utah 449, 
69 P. 2d 491 
is decisive of the question in this jurisdiction. 
In that case each of the five judges then sitting 
wrote separate opinions, and while the members of the 
Court differed sharply on whether the complaint in fact 
alleged a nuisance, yet all five members of the Court, 
including Mr. Justice Wolfe, seemed without question 
, , to accept the doctrine that sovereign immunity does not 
apply where the sovereign maintains or permits a 
nuisance upon its premises. The only difference is that 
the Husband case relates to a municipal corporation 
11 
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rather than a board of education, but, as we have pointed 
out supra, numerous Courts and text· writers draw no 
distinction between a board of education and any other 
kind of agency of sovereignty. 
We desire to call attention particularly to the 
language of Mr. Justice Wolfe in his separate, concur-
. . . 
r1ng op1ruon : 
Again: 
''But I am willing to hold the city liable on the 
theory of respondeat superior for the negligence 
of the driver of this sprinkling wagon. I think 
the decisions have gone to ridiculous lengths in 
giving municipalities immunity from the negli-
gence of their employees on the ground that the 
work in which such employees were engaged was 
in pursuance of governmental purpose. In the 
case of Lehi City vs. Meiling, 87 Utah 237, 48 P. 
2d 530, I had something to say about the continual 
growth in the extent and kind of municipal func-
tions and the obscurity of the line between gov-
ernmental and proprietary functions.'' 
''I am in favor of restricting municipal immunity 
for the negligence of its employees while engaged 
in the city's business to that commited in the 
pursuit of actual protection of persons and prop-
erty or preserving the peace of the community 
or some other police duty which it exercises as an 
agency of the state.'' 
In other words, Mr. Justice Wolfe, while holding 
that the complaint in question did not allege a nuisance, 
yet he believed that the complaint stated a cause of 
a.ction. 
It is submitted, therefore, that in vie~ of the pre· 
vious pronouncements of this Court, that it will now 
12. 
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adhere to the enlightened and hnmanitarinn dor+rine 
that any agenc-y of government is not immune from suit 
for damages or injury to person or property caused by 
the maintenance of a nuisance. 
POINT. 2. PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COM-
PLAINT STATES FACTS SUFFICIENT TO SUP-
PORT A FINDING OF A JURY THAT THE CON-
DITION OF WHICH PLAINTIFF COMPLAINS WAS 
IN FACT A NUISANCE. 
In the event this Court accepts our contention as 
to Point 1, then it becomes necessary to determine 
whether or not plaintiff's amended complaint states a 
cause of action. That is, whether or not sufficient 
facts are alleged in the complaint, all of which are ad-
mitted by the general demurrer, from which a jury 
could find that the defendant did in fact maintain a 
nuisance upon its school grounds. 
Our statute, 
Section 103-41-1, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1943, 
provides as follows: 
''Whatever is dangerous to human life or health, 
and whatever renders soil, air, water or food 
impure or unwholesome, are declared to he nui-
sances and to be illegal, and every person, 
whether owner, agent or occupant, having aided 
in creating or contributing to the same or who 
may support, continue, or retain any of them, is 
guilty of a m.isdeameanor.'' 
Reverting to the Husband case, cited supra, the 
members of this Court, as then constituted, divided 
sharply on the question of whether or not the complaint 
13· 
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in that case alleged facts sufficient to constitute the 
operation of the sprinkling wagon a nuisanee. Mr~ 
Justice Hansen was of the opinion that a jury might 
well find from the facts alleged in the complaint that 
the same constituted a nuisance. The other members of 
the Court disagreed with Mr. Justice Hansen on this 
question. 
Mr. Justice Hansen in his dissenting opinion quotes 
extensively from various cases in an attempt to define 
the term ''nuisance.'' H;e says: 
''The term 'nuisance' has been said to be incap~ 
able of definition so as to fit all cases 'because 
the controlling facts are seldom alike and each 
case stands on its own footing.'' 
He quotes with approval from the case of 
Dahl vs. Utah Oil Refining Company, 
71 U tab 1, 262 Pac. 269, 
which held that in determining whether a business as 
conducted constituted a nuisance, the question was one 
of degree and must be detertW.ned by the facts and cir-
cumstances involved, being a questio~ of fact. He then 
quotes from . 
46 c. J. 654 
as follows: 
''The question as to what eonstitutes a nuisance 
depends upon the nature and result of the acts 
of which complaint is made and not upon the 
means by which produced or the particular des-
cription applied to them. Whether a nuisance 
exists is a question to be determined, not merely 
by an abstract consideration of the thing itself; 
1~ 
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but in reference to its circumstanees. For in-
stance, the reasonableness of the use, the locality, 
the extent of the injury, the nature and effect 
of the matters complained of, are matters that 
must be considered. No particular fact is con-
clusiYe. All the attending circumstances must be 
taken into consideration.'' 
He further states: 
"It frequently happens that the same act or 
omission may constitute negligence and at the 
same time give rise to a nuisance, and the ~xist­
ence of a nuisance frequently may presuppose 
negligence, the two torts being co-existing and 
incapable of separation. (Citing cases) Whether 
a given situation, therefore, gives rise to an action 
based solely upon negligence or solely upon the 
creation or existence of a nuisance may become 
a most difficult question to decide, but the mere 
difficulty involved cannot alter the necessity to 
make a decision whenever the facts and circum-
stances create that necessity. The law has long 
recognized the two types of tort and has estab-
lished principles and remedies to govern each. 
It is the Court's duty to apply such principles 
and remedies. The inability to precisely deline-
ate, by a satisfactory formula, the division be-
tween negligence and nuisance, must of necessity 
leave the Court and triers of the fact more or 
less free to say whether negligence or a nuisance 
is involved in any particular case. But as a 
guide the following principles have been enunci-
ated. To find a nuisance the dangerous con-
dition must have been consciously created. That 
is, during the performance of its acts the defend-
ant must have known or it must have been obvious 
and practically certain to a reasonably prudent 
person that what it was doing was creating or 
15 
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was helping to create a dangerous condition. The 
condition brought about by its acts must have 
been a conscious objective of the defendant or its 
. acts must have been so reckless and unwarranted 
as to conclusively imply such intention. The acts 
which give rise to the condition may be negligent 
acts but if the condition itself which these acts 
produced was an objective of the defendant. and 
was dangerous, or if the defendant, as a reason-
ably prudent person obviously and certainly must 
have known that the condition which it was creat-
ing was or would be dangerous, then, even though 
it did not intend danger or the unfortunate re-
sults, it was under obligation to refrain from 
performing the acts creating such condition. It 
then becomes no longer a question of exercising 
care in the performance of such acts. It be-
comes an absolute duty not to pe'rform the 
creative acts at all. The wrongfulness thus has 
shifted to the doing of the acts. as distinguished 
from the mere failure to exercise care in their 
performance. A nuisance arises from the vio-
lation of an absolute duty not to do and is thus 
distinguished from negligence which involves the 
requisite care in the doing." 
We have quoted somewhat liberally from Mr. Justice 
Hansen's opinion for the reason that, as we understand 
it the other members of the Court found no fault with 
' Mr. Justice Hansen's dissertation on the law of nuisance, 
but rather concluded that the facts and circumstances 
involved did not measure· up to the requirements of a 
nuisance. 
The subject of what constitutes a nuisance is dis· 
cussed in 
39 Am .. J ur. 380, Section 2. 
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In the case of 
Hall vs. Putneys, 10 NE 2d 204, 
the following definition 'Yas used by the court: 
In 
'• The term 'nuisance' extends to everything that 
endangers life or health, g·ives offense to the 
sense, violates the la'Y of decency, or obstructs 
the reasonable and comfortable use of property.'' 
39 Am. Jur. 282, Section 4, 
the author distinguishes between ''nuisance'' and '' negli-
gence.'' 
In the case of 
Hoffman vs. City of Bristol, supra, 
a rather complete discussion of what constituted nuisance 
according to the facts therein involved was entered 
into by the Court and the Court on page 501 of 155 Atl. 
reached the following conclusion: 
''In the Hewison Case the weight overhanging the 
street, in theDyer case the dead tree within the 
street limits, in the Riccio Case the tree pro-
truding over the highway, in the Rogers Case 
the catch-basin cover, if constituting a nuisance, 
was such that the only duty of the city was to 
remove or abate it. If it was not a structure or 
condition created by the city, certainly not by 
acts which were wrongful in nature or in intent 
actual or implied; the fault, if any, consisted in 
the failure to use requisite care in remedying a 
condition othe_rwise created or occurring. There-
in lies the distinction between nuisance to which 
governmental immunity does not attach, and mere 
negligence as to which it is available. Herman 
v. Buffalo, 214 N.Y. 316, 108 N.E. 451." 
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There are many other cases which could be cited 
but we doubt that it would be helpful to the Court. 
Many of them are cited in Mr. Justice Hansen's opinion 
in the Husband case. 
It seems to us, therefore, that the real question pre-
sented is whether or not the allegations of the amended 
complaint do in fact allege a condition which was so 
obviousl~ dangerous to life, and particularly to the 
lives of small children, that a jury might find, as a ques-
tion of fact, that the same would in fact constitute a 
nuisance. With that thought in mind, let us look to the 
allegations of the amended complaint on this subject. 
It is alleged in Paragraph 5 (a) that the defend-
ant, by and through its agents, operated and main· 
tained a certain incinerator consisting of a cylindrical 
body of steel or similar construction 43 inches in dia· 
meter and 52 inches in height; that was provided with 
an opening at or near the bottom, approximately 15 
inches in diameter, with another opening at or near 
the center approximating 15 x 11 inches, into which 
was deposited, from day to day, various and sundry 
books, magazines, papers debris and other combustible· 
materials. That there \Yas also deposited therein empty 
cans and other trash, and that at regular periods 
the same was ignited and burned, and tliat the hot 
ashes, embers, cans and other hot and burning sub .. 
stances were either permitted to be discharged through 
said opening or were removed from said incinerator 
and allowed to . accumulate while still hot and burn-
ing over several feet distance from said incinerator, 
and that the same was allowed to remain in an 
open and unguarded place upon the open school grounds 
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adjacent to an area reser\'·ed for children of all ages 
to play thereon and in that immediate vicinity. 
While of course a Yie"T of this incinerator and the 
way it "Tas operated is not available to the members 
of this Court, it "Till be available to a jury if the case 
is tried. But "Te submit that this description of the 
large incinerator, of the materials ''"'hicb were burned 
therein, and of the ""ay the hot residue was removed 
therefrom and allowed to accumulate for some distance 
therefrom, certainly created a condition that was dan-
gerous to life and limb. Then, too, it must be remem-
bered and it is so alleged that this area was open play-
ground where chil~ren of all ages assembled for re-
creational activities. 
It is further alleged that this condition existed for 
a long time prior to the 14th day of October, 1948, with 
the knowledge of the defendant. 
It is further alleged that it was further known to 
the defendant that small children of pre-school age 
residing in the neighborhood customarily played upon 
these school grounds with the knowledge and acquies-
cence of the defendant, and that the defendant knew 
or should have known that the natural tendency of 
allowing this condition to exist did create a dangerous 
and hazardous condition and that it might inflict in-
jury upon children of tender years who resorted to said 
schoolgrounds for play. 
All of these facts are admited by the demurrer. 
We cannot conceive of a more dangerous situation. 
It is difficult to understand bow a sc.bool board would 
permit an incinerator to be placed upon a playground 
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where children of tender years resorted for play, and 
it is beyond understanding why it would permit the hot, 
burning substances to be removed therefrom and scat-
tered, while still hot and burning, around the inciner-
ator, without any protection to small children. Certainly 
it ought to be obvious to anyone that children run and 
play and that a child of tender years might conceivably 
trip or fall into the hot, burning embers. We say that 
. if the defendant permitted a condition like that to exist 
over a period of time, that it constituted more than 
mere negligence, that it was a nuisance as defined by 
our own statute. Or at any rate we say that a jury 
might very well find from such a condition that a nui-
sance in fact existed. 
As we view it, the other allegations of the comp-
laint are immaterial to the question raised upon this 
appeal. It is, however, alleged that on the 14th day of 
October, 1948, this little child, two years of age, daugh-
ter of the plaintiff, who lived near the school grounds, 
was riding a tricycle on the playgrounds and .that while 
passing near this incinerator she either tripped or was 
otherwise thrown or fell from the tricycle into these 
hot ashes and burning embers, cans and other debris, 
which was scattered about the incinerator, and that 
she was severely burned. The extent of her injuries is 
alleged as well as the terrific cost to the father for hos-
pital and doctor bills. This little girl, notwithstanding 
e;tensive plastic surgery, Is permanently disfigured 
and maimed for life. 
It certainly presents a case where, in the language 
of writers, it seems humanitarian that this loss should 
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be borne by the members of Ogden City's school dis-
trict than to be heaped upon this little girl and her 
father. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants urge \Yith all the sineer~ty they posses 
that this Court should adopt the modern, humanitarian 
view that a board of education should not be immune 
from from maintaining or permitting a nuisance to be 
maintained upon its public school grounds, and fur-
thermore that the allegations of this amended comp-
laint, all of which are admitted by the demurrer, state 
facts sufficient to permit a jury, if believed, to find 
that the condition therein described was in fact a nui-
sance and that the order of the lower Court sustaining 
the demurrer and dismissing the action should be re-
versed. 
Respe~tfully submitted, 
Thatcher & Young, 
1018 First Security B:ank Bldg., 
Ogden, Utah 
William H. Bowman, 
Thatcher Building, 
Pueblo, Colorado 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
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